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Abstract
In this paper I characterize time consistent equilibrium in an economy with price
rigidity and an optimizing monetary authority operating under discretion. Firms have
the option to increase their frequency of price change, at a cost, in response to higher
inﬂation. Previous studies, which assume a constant degree of price rigidity across
inﬂation regimes, ﬁnd two time consistent equilibria — one with low inﬂation, the other
with high inﬂation. In contrast, when price rigidity is endogenous, the high inﬂation
equilibrium ceases to exist. Hence, time consistent equilibrium is unique. This result
depends on two features of the analysis: (1) a plausible quantitative speciﬁcation of the
ﬁxed cost of price change, and (2) the presence of an arbitrarily small cost of inﬂation
that is independent of price rigidity.
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11. INTRODUCTION
Central bank policy is best characterized as being set with discretion. That is, monetary
policy makers do not simply implement policy plans determined in the past. So while
it is crucial to characterize optimal policy under commitment, it is equally important to
understand what outcomes arise when it is recognized that policy makers act with discretion.
In this paper, I characterize time consistent equilibrium in a model with monetary discretion
and an endogenously determined degree of price rigidity. The objective is to determine
whether the model plausibly generates self-fulﬁlling, high inﬂation equilibria.
Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983) describe linear-quadratic
economies in which the interaction between monetary discretion and a forward-looking
private sector produce unique equilibrium. This equilibrium displays expected and realized
inﬂation higher than that obtained under commitment. More recently, the issue has been
studied in dynamic general equilibrium models of the monetary transmission mechanism.
In these economies, equilibria are generally not unique. Expectation traps arise in which
equilibria associated with expectations of low or high inﬂation become self-fulﬁlling. Hence,
these models rationalize the view that the experience of the US during the 1970’s was due
to a high inﬂation expectation trap.
Using the methods of Chari and Kehoe (1990), Chari et al. (1998) demonstrate this
multiplicity in a sticky price model in which agents play trigger strategies (see also Barro and
Gordon, 1983, Section IV). An important shortcoming, however, is that the play of trigger
strategies admits many possible equilibria.1 Two recent papers — Albanesi et al. (2003) and
King and Wolman (2004) — study discretionary policy when reputational mechanisms are
ruled out. These papers show that expectation traps remain; that is, multiplicity does not
rely on folk-theorem type reasoning, but is a germane feature of monetary discretion.
The intuition can be roughly summarized as follows. Firms are monopolistic and set
sticky prices. Price rigidity provides an incentive for the monetary authority to generate
1In a highly related framework, Ireland (1997) shows that the same model that predicts expectation traps
predicts the ﬁrst-best, commitment solution as an equilibrium outcome as well.
2unexpected inﬂation. Since the output of sticky price ﬁrms is demand determined, this
stimulates output and reduces the monopoly distortion. Costs associated with realized
inﬂation generate a trade-oﬀ, so that the monetary authority produces positive, but ﬁnite,
inﬂation. Forward-looking ﬁrms account for this when setting prices. If ﬁrms coordinate
expectations on low inﬂation occurring, they set accordingly low prices. If ﬁrms expect high
inﬂation, they set high prices. Accommodation by the monetary authority validates private
sector expectations. Hence, accommodation generates the possibility of multiple equilibria.
And accommodation is precisely the hallmark of policy discretion.
A problem with this reasoning is that it relies heavily on the degree of price rigidity being
exogenously given. With sticky prices, a ﬁrm’s future price is not permitted to adjust for
inﬂation that happens between now and then. Expectations of high inﬂation lead ﬁrms to set
high prices now, thus compelling the monetary authority to deliver on those expectations.
While assuming exogenously rigid prices is fruitful for monetary business cycle analysis,
it seems problematic in formulating an explanation for high inﬂation episodes such as the
1970’s experience. This is particularly true since the exogeneity of price rigidity is central
to generating high inﬂation equilibria in these models.
Here, I consider an economy in which the degree of price rigidity is endogenous. The
objective is to determine the robustness of the expectation trap result in such a model,
absent an appeal to reputational mechanisms. In the face of high inﬂation, ﬁrms can choose
to incur a ﬁxed cost to increase their frequency of price change. When the degree of price
rigidity is allowed to adjust, the high inﬂation equilibrium ceases to exist. Time consistent
equilibrium is unique.2 This result depends on: (1) a quantitatively reasonable speciﬁcation
of the ﬁxed cost of price change, and (2) the presence of an arbitrarily small welfare cost of
realized inﬂation that is independent of rigid prices.
I show this in two steps. First, I consider a ‘simpliﬁed’ model in which realized inﬂation
is costly only when prices are sticky, so that only feature (1) is operational. Two time
2Ireland (2000) shows how multiplicity in the class of models considered by Ireland (1997) and Chari et
al. (1998) can be eliminated by relaxing the assumption of rational expectations. For a critical assessment
of expectation traps closer in spirit to that considered here, see Barseghyan and Di Cecio (2005).
3consistent equilibria exist, one with low inﬂation, the other with high inﬂation. For reason-
able speciﬁcations of the ﬁxed cost of price change, the steady state of the high inﬂation
equilibrium displays full price ﬂexibility. With full ﬂexibility, the cost-beneﬁtt r a d e - o ﬀ in
inﬂation disappears and the monetary authority is indiﬀerent across inﬂation outcomes.
Next, I introduce feature (2), an arbitrarily small cost of inﬂation that is present regardless
of whether prices are sticky or ﬂexible. This breaks the monetary authority’s indiﬀerence
at full price ﬂexibility. Thus, the high inﬂation equilibrium is eliminated in quantitatively
relevant versions of the model, so that time consistent equilibrium is unique.
Section 2 presents the simpliﬁed model and Section 3 characterizes equilibrium for ar-
bitrary monetary policy. Section 4 details the crucial strategic complementarity in ﬁrm’s
pricing decisions that is the source of multiplicity, and how this depends on the speciﬁca-
tion of policy. Section 5 characterizes Markov perfect equilibrium in which the discretionary
monetary authority maximizes private sector welfare. Section 6 analyzes Markov perfect
equilibrium and Section 7 discusses the arbitrarily small perturbation of the model that
eliminates the high inﬂation equilibrium. Section 8 concludes.
2. THE MODEL
Consider a perfect foresight, inﬁnite horizon economy populated by: a representative
ﬁnal good ﬁrm; a continuum of monopolistically competitive intermediate good ﬁrms; a
representative household; and a discretionary monetary authority. Sticky prices among
intermediate good ﬁr m sa d m i t sn o n - n e u t r a le ﬀects of monetary policy.
Speciﬁcally, ﬁrms make a pricing decision every second period; half of ﬁr m sd os oi n
odd periods, the other half in even, so that pricing decisions are staggered. This friction
alone generates the welfare trade-oﬀ in inﬂation for the monetary authority (hereafter MA).
Unexpected inﬂation erodes the real value of sticky prices, reducing the monopoly pricing
distortion. But with staggered pricing, realized inﬂation generates a relative price distortion,
and hence misallocation of resources across ﬁrms. In making its policy choice, the MA must
balance the marginal beneﬁto fi n ﬂation, from the erosion of the monopoly distortion, with
4the marginal cost, from the exacerbation of the relative price distortion. To introduce
endogenous price rigidity, a ﬁrm’s pricing decision is modeled as having two dimensions:
the price(s) to charge and the frequency of price change. I elaborate on this below.
Timing within a period is as follows: ﬁrst, the MA chooses the growth rate of the money
stock; after observing this, private sector decisions are made. At the beginning of a period,
the state observed by the MA is denoted s ∈ σ, which I call the MA state.T o i l l u s t r a t e
the mechanisms generating multiplicity or uniqueness as clearly as possible, reputational
mechanisms are explicitly ruled out.3 Attention is restricted to the play of Markov strate-
gies, so that s contains only fundamental or ‘pay-oﬀ relevant’ information. Firms make
pricing decisions every second period so the oldest price being charged at any point in time
is one period old. The MA’s strategy is therefore conditioned only on information inherited
from the previous period. In particular, s =(¯ p,z),w h e r e¯ p ≡ ¯ Pt−1/Mt−1 is the normalized
sticky price set by ﬁrms making pricing decisions in the previous period, and z ≡ zt−1 is the
fraction of those ﬁrms choosing to set prices on a period-by-period basis. After observing
s, the MA chooses a gross money growth rate, X.T h a ti s ,i fMt is the money stock at date
t, Xt = Mt/Mt−1.
Private sector decisions are made after observing (s,X).C a l l (s,X) the private sector
or PS state. Among these decisions are choices for s0 =(¯ p0,z0). Since private sector agents
make intertemporal decisions, they must have beliefs about how policy is chosen in the
future. Since the MA acts after observing s, these beliefs are summarized as a money
growth rule or policy rule, χ(.):σ → R+. This timing is illustrated in Figure 1.
2.1. Final Good Production
Final good ﬁrms are perfectly competitive and produce output using intermediate goods
as input. Final goods are consumed by households. The representative ﬁrm’s problem is:
max
{yi}
P
∙Z 1
0
y
(λ−1)/λ
i di
¸λ/(λ−1)
−
Z 1
0
Piyidi, λ > 1.
3Discussion regarding the extension of results to other equilibrium concepts such sustainable equilibrium
are contained in Section 8.
5Here: P is the price of ﬁnal output; Pi is the input price set by intermediate good ﬁrm
i ∈ [0,1];a n dλ is the elasticity of substitution across intermediate goods. The ﬁrst-order
necessary condition (FONC) for this problem states the familiar ‘demand as a function of
relative price’ condition:
yi =
µ
P
Pi
¶λ
y, y ≡
∙Z 1
0
y
(λ−1)/λ
i di
¸λ/(λ−1)
.
2.2. Intermediate Good Production
Intermediate good ﬁrms produce goods using labor according to yi = hi.L a b o ri sh i r e da t
the competitive wage W. Linearity in production implies that the nominal wage is exactly
the ﬁrm’s nominal marginal cost.
Price rigidity is introduced via the decision-making constraints of these ﬁrms. Suppose
ﬁrms have only one option in their pricing decision: choose a single price to charge in the
current and following period after observing the PS state, (s,X). This is the standard, two-
period Taylor (1980) form of price stickiness found in the monetary business cycle literature
(see, for example, the textbook treatment of Romer, 2001, ch. 6), and is the speciﬁcation
used in King and Wolman (2004), hereafter KW.
In this paper, a ﬁrm making its pricing decision has two options: (a) be sticky,a n d
choose a single price after observing (s,X) for the current and following period; or (b)
be ﬂexible, and choose one price for the current period after observing (s,X), and another
price in the next period after observing (s0,X0). Choosing option (b) requires paying a ﬁxed
cost.4 This ﬁxed cost corresponds to the incremental decision-making and implementation
cost of one additional price change within the same duration of time. Firms choose their
frequency of price change in response to expected inﬂation. This speciﬁcation is chosen for
the sake of expositional clarity. The key results are robust to and, in fact, strengthened
in more elaborate speciﬁcations of endogenous price rigidity, such as those used in the
state-dependent pricing literature; see Sections 7 and 8.
4This is equivalent to assuming that ﬁrms pay a ﬁxed cost for every price change, but that they are forced
to do so at least every second period.
62.2.1. Sticky prices If a ﬁrm chooses to set a sticky price, it chooses a single price, ¯ P0,
to maximize two-period discounted proﬁts:
¯ Υ ≡ max
¯ P0
h
α
³
Pλ ¯ P01−λy − WPλ ¯ P0−λy
´
+ βα0
³
P0λ ¯ P01−λy0 − W0P0λ ¯ P0−λy0
´i
,
where primes (0) denote one-period-ahead variables. Here, the ﬁnal good ﬁrm’s demand
function has been substituted in, and α is the marginal value of current proﬁtt ot h e
representative household. I denote the sticky price set today with a prime since this is the
price (after normalization) that is inherited in the MA state, s0,i nt h efollowing period. In
a symmetric equilibrium, all sticky price ﬁrms charge the same two-period price:
¯ P0 = ˆ λ
µ
αPλyW + βα0P0λy0W0
αPλy + βα0P0λy0
¶
, ˆ λ =
λ
λ − 1
,
which is a markup, ˆ λ, over the weighted sum of current and future marginal cost.
2.2.2. Flexible prices If a ﬁrm chooses to be ﬂexible, it chooses a price to charge today,
˜ P, and a price to charge tomorrow, ˜ P0, according to:
˜ P = ˆ λW, ˜ P0 = ˆ λW0.
Since these prices are chosen after observing the MA’s action in each period, they are set
optimally as a markup over observed marginal cost.
To set ﬂexible prices, a ﬁrm must pay a ﬁxed cost, φ. This represents the units of labor
it will expend to set a new price after observing M0.A ﬁrm will choose option (b) over
option (a) if the diﬀerence in discounted two-period proﬁts is greater than the ﬁxed cost.
That is, a ﬁrm with ﬁxed cost φi will choose to be ﬂexible if:
α˜ Π + βα0
h
˜ Π0 − W0φi
i
≥ ¯ Υ,
where ˜ Π =
³
˜ P − W
´³
P/˜ P
´λ
y denote optimized one-period proﬁts. Call this condition
the cut-oﬀ condition.
The CDF for the ﬁxed cost among ﬁrms making their pricing decisions is denoted F (φ).
A primary goal of this paper is to show that for plausible magnitudes of φ, ﬁrms choose to
7be ﬂe x i b l ea so p p o s e dt os t i c k yi nh i g hi n ﬂation equilibria. Hence, the exact speciﬁcation
of the distribution is not important; simply that the support is bounded with a maximal
value, φmax.5 Denote the value of the ﬁx e dc o s tt h a ts a t i s ﬁes the cut-oﬀ condition with
equality as φ∗.A l lﬁrms with φi ≤ φ∗ choose to set ﬂexible prices, while all others set sticky
prices. The fraction of ﬁrms currently making pricing decisions that choose ﬂexibility is
denoted as z0 = F (φ∗). I denote this with a prime since this is the fraction of current
price-setters choosing ﬂexibility that is inherited by the MA in the following period. If the
cut-oﬀ condition holds with inequality at φmax,t h e nz0 =1 .
2.3. Households
Households value consumption (c)a n dl a b o r( h) according to:
X
t
βt [log(c) − ψh], 0 <β<1,ψ> 0.
The household faces two sequences of constraints. The ﬁrst is the ﬂow budget constraint:
Mt + Bt ≤ Rt−1Bt−1 + Mt−1 − Pt−1ct−1 +( 1+θt−1)
µ
Wt−1ht−1 +
Z 1
0
Πi,t−1di
¶
+ Tt.
This is relevant during securities trading in each period t.6 Here: Bt is nominal bond
holdings that pay a gross return of Rt upon maturity at date t+1; Mt is the value of money
holdings; Pt is the consumption good price; Wt is the nominal wage rate; Πi,t are nominal
proﬁts from ﬁrm i ∈ [0,1];a n dTt is a lump-sum transfer from the MA. Finally, θt is a
subsidy to production income.
After securities trading, households interact with ﬁrms in the goods and labor markets.
The household supplies labor at the wage Wt, and buys consumption at the price Pt.
Consumption purchases are subject to a cash-in-advance constraint:
Mt ≥ Ptct, ∀t.
5Indeed, the distribution can be degenerate at φmax without altering any of the key results. Allowing for
a smooth CDF aids both in exposition (since it eliminates discrete jumps from full rigidity to full ﬂexibility)
and in numerical computation of equilibrium.
6Trading occurs after observing the PS state, so this model displays the standard ‘Lucas timing’ of events
within a period. See Lucas (1982) and the textbook treatment of Sargent (1987), ch. 5.
8The household’s intertemporal FONC is:
1
Pc
= βR
1
P0c0,
In equilibrium, R ≥ 1, so that the cash-in-advance constraint holds with equality. Substi-
tuting this into the FONC delivers:
χ
¡
s0¢
=
M0
M
= βR.
That is, in equilibrium, the rate of nominal interest reﬂects the expected rate of money
growth relative to time preference.
The household’s intratemporal FONC is:
1
c
µ
1+θ
R
¶
W
P
= ψ.
Absent the subsidy (θ =0 ), a non-zero nominal interest rate drives a wedge between the
real wage and the marginal rate of substitution in consumption and labor. This interest
rate distortion represents the fact that expected future inﬂation erodes the return to current
labor eﬀort in cash-in-advance models (see Cooley and Hansen, 1989).
Is e tθ = R − 1 to eliminate this distortion. I do this for two reasons. First, the cost of
expected future inﬂation cannot be inﬂuenced by the current MA; eliminating this makes
c l e a rt h a ti ti st h ew e l f a r et r a d e - o ﬀ between the current beneﬁto funexpected inﬂation and
the current cost of realized inﬂation that characterizes monetary discretion. Second, setting
θ = R − 1 and using the cash-in-advance constraint, the intratemporal FONC becomes:
W = ψM,
so that in equilibrium, the growth rate of the nominal wage between any two periods, t and
t+1, is determined by the money growth rate between t and t+1. This ensures that across
low and high inﬂation regimes, aggregate price level inﬂation is appropriately reﬂected in
the growth rate of wages/marginal cost.7 Finally, note that with θ = R − 1,t h em a r g i n a l
value of current proﬁti sg i v e nb yα =1 /Pc.
7This discussion makes clear that it would be inappropriate to consider ‘real rigidities’ (see, for example,
Ball and Romer, 1991) in the current analysis. Such considerations typically manifest themselves in the
92.4. Government Budget Constraint
The budget constraint faced by the MA is:
Tt = Mt − Mt−1 − θt−1
µ
Wt−1ht−1 +
Z 1
0
Πi,t−1di
¶
, ∀t.
The lump-sum transfer to the household ﬁnances the monetary injection, net of the subsidy
to production income. The MA does not issue or purchase nominal bonds, so these are in
zero net supply.
3. PRIVATE SECTOR EQUILIBRIUM
Though ultimate interest is in characterizing Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE), I ﬁrst
deﬁne a private sector equilibrium (PSE) in which the MA’s current action, X,a n df u t u r e
policy, χ, need not be welfare maximizing. In the deﬁnition, lower-case variables denote
nominal variables determined in the current period normalized by the current money stock,
e.g. p ≡ P/M, ¯ p0 ≡ ¯ P0/M, ˜ p ≡ ˜ P/M, etc. I do this since all equilibria are neutral in the
usual sense: if the initial money stock is doubled, a PSE exists in which all real allocations
are identical and only nominal variables are doubled.
Given that ﬁrms and households make intertemporal decisions, these agents must have
expectations about how policy is determined in the future. This is given by the policy
rule, χ. Moreover, anticipating results, certain policy rules admit multiple PSE. As a
result, agents must understand how expectations are coordinated across equilibria. Since
attention is restricted to perfect foresight environments, this amounts to understanding
which equilibrium will prevail in each period. In much of the analysis to follow, the policy
rule will admit two equilibria: an optimistic equilibrium with low inﬂation, and a pessimistic
equilibrium with high inﬂation. I introduce an indicator, ζ, that takes on one of two values,
ζ ∈ {lo,hi}, denoting whether expectations are coordinated on the optimistic or pessimistic
household’s intratemporal FONC. In equilibrium, this would generate divergences between money growth
and marginal cost growth that would not be appropriate for the study of perfectly anticipated, trend inﬂation
d u et od i s c r e t i o ni nm o n e t a r yp o l i c y .
10equilibrium occurring in the current and all future periods.8 In the following deﬁnition, I
index private sector decision rules by both χ and ζ to emphasize this dependence of current
behavior on expectations.9
Deﬁnition 1 Given beliefs (a policy rule) χ and (an indicator) ζ, for all PS states (s,X),
a private sector equilibrium is a set of allocation rules {c(s,X;χ,ζ), h(s,X;χ,ζ)}, pricing
rules {¯ p0 (s,X;χ,ζ), ˜ p(s,X;χ,ζ), z0 (s,X;χ,ζ)}, and prices {R(s,X;χ,ζ), p(s,X;χ,ζ)}
such that: households are optimizing, prices are set optimally, z0 (s,X;χ,ζ) satisﬁes the
cut-oﬀ condition, the goods, labor, and bond markets clear, and R(s,X;χ,ζ) ≥ 1.
B yW a l r a s ’L a w ,t h em o n e ym a r k e tc l e a r s .
In the rest of this section, I provide a more compact characterization of PSE. First,
the household’s intratemporal FONC states that the normalized wage is constant, w = ψ.
Hence, the normalized ﬂexible price is also constant, ˜ p = ˆ λψ.
Final good ﬁrm maximization generates the following normalized price level equation:
p(s,X;χ,ζ)=
½
1
2
∙
(1 − z)
³ ¯ p
X
´1−λ
+
¡
1 − z0¢
¯ p01−λ +
¡
z + z0¢³
ˆ λψ
´1−λ¸¾ 1
1−λ
, (1)
where z0 = z0 (s,X;χ,ζ) and ¯ p0 =¯ p0 (s,X;χ,ζ). From the cash-in-advance constraint:
c(s,X;χ,ζ)=1 /p(s,X;χ,ζ). (2)
The labor market clearing condition is:
h(s,X;χ,ζ)=
pλ−1
2
∙
(1 − z)
³ ¯ p
X
´−λ
+
¡
1 − z0¢
¯ p0−λ +
¡
z + z0¢³
ˆ λψ
´−λ¸
+
1
2
Z F−1(z)
0
φdF (φ), (3)
8It is also possible for expectations to ﬂuctuate deterministically over time. In this case, ζ represents an
entire sequence of time-indexed indicators. Stochastic equilibria can also be constructed, in which case ζ
represents a sunspot shock. Given that the primary objective of this paper is to determine when equilibrium
is unique, I focus on the simple case described above.
9For simplicity, I do not index χ by ζ in Deﬁnition 1 since PSE is deﬁned for arbitrary policy. That is,
future money growth is assumed to depend only on s
0, independent of which equilibrium is expected. In the
analysis of MPE, χ will be indexed by ζ, since the optimal policy response of the MA will depend on private
sector behavior, which depends on coordination of expectations.
11where p = p(s,X;χ,ζ). Finally, the intertemporal FONC bounds the set of feasible PSE
money growth rules; R(s,X;χ,ζ)=χ(s0)/β,s ot h a tχ(s) ≥ β for all s.
Hence, equilibrium p(.), c(.), h(.),a n dR(.) are determined residually from ¯ p0 (.) and
z0 (.). These are determined as follows. The FONC for sticky price-setting implies that:
¯ p0 = ˆ λψ
Ã
pλ−1 + βp0λ−1χ(s0)
λ
pλ−1 + βp0λ−1χ(s0)
λ−1
!
, (4)
where p0 = p(s0,χ(s0);χ,ζ). Finally, the cut-oﬀ condition states that z0 = F (φ∗) satisﬁes:
pλ−1
³
ˆ λψ
´λ
³
ˆ λ − 1
´
ψ + β
⎡
⎢
⎣
p0λ−1
³
ˆ λψ
´λ
³
ˆ λ − 1
´
− φ∗
⎤
⎥
⎦ψ ≥
pλ−1
¯ p0λ
¡
¯ p0 − ψ
¢
+ βp0λ−1
µ
χ(s0)
¯ p0
¶λ µ
¯ p0
χ(s0)
− ψ
¶
. (5)
This holds with strict equality whenever φ∗ <φ max, and with weak inequality whenever
φ∗ = φmax. Conditions (4) and (5) characterize PSE ¯ p0 and z0. Remaining PSE objects are
determined as described above. This simplifying result is summarized as follows:
Proposition 2 Given beliefs χ and ζ, a PSE is characterized as decision rules, ¯ p0 ≡
P(s,X;χ,ζ) and z0 ≡ Z(s,X;χ,ζ), such that for all (s,X), equations (4) and (5) are
satisﬁed.
From the equilibrium conditions it is clear that the only pay-oﬀ relevant variables inherited
b yt h ec u r r e n tM Af r o mt h ep a s ta r et h ep r e v i o u s period’s pricing decisions. Hence, when
attention is turned to MPE, the MA state is s =(¯ p,z).
Moreover, when the MA inherits fully ﬂexible prices, current money growth is neutral.
The intuition for this is obvious.10 With no inherited price stickiness, current money growth
has no eﬀect on the monopoly distortion or the relative price distortion, since this inﬂuence
requires the presence of sticky prices.
10To see this in the equilibrium characterization, note that when z =1 , current money growth, X,h a sn o
direct inﬂuence on the normalized price level, p (see equation (1)). But since X enters the decision rules, P
and Z, only indirectly via p (see equations (4) and (5)), there is no inﬂuence of current money growth on ¯ p
0
and z
0 when z =1 . Hence, there is no eﬀect on consumption or hours worked (see equations (2) and (3)).
124. MULTIPLICITY OF EQUILIBRIUM
Having characterized PSE, it is possible to illustrate the potential for multiple equilibria.
This section demonstrates that multiplicity of PSE stems from a strategic complementarity
across ﬁrms’ pricing decisions for particular monetary policy rules. Monetary policy will
satisfy these conditions whenever it is suﬃciently accommodative of private sector expec-
tations. It is this multiplicity of PSE that translates into multiple MPE when the MA is
maximizing.11 This is taken up in Sections 5 and 6.
4.1. Strategic Complementarity in Price-Setting
This strategic complementarity is ﬁrst illustrated by KW and I discuss it here for com-
pleteness. To do so, it is easiest to work with their model, which is a special case of that
presented here. In KW, choosing to increase the frequency of price change (i.e., charging
one price for each period, as opposed to charging one price for two periods) is inﬁnitely
costly. All ﬁrms act as sticky price ﬁrms in PSE. The MA and PS states are reduced to
s =¯ p and (s,X)=(¯ p,X), respectively.
Consider the following rewriting of the FONC for sticky price-setting:
¯ p0 = ˆ λ
£
(1 − γ)ψ + γχ
¡
¯ p0¢
ψ
¤
. (6)
The normalized two-period price is a markup over a weighted average of current and future
marginal cost, where the relative weight on future marginal cost is given by:
γ =
βp0λ−1χ(¯ p0)
λ−1
pλ−1 + βp0λ−1χ(¯ p0)
λ−1 ∈ (0,1).
In the expression for γ, the current price level is given by (1) with z = z0 =0 ,a n dt h e
future price level is:
p0 =
(
1
2
"µ
¯ p0
χ(¯ p0)
¶1−λ
+¯ p001−λ
#) 1
1−λ
,
11Note that this diﬀers from the multiplicity result of Albanesi et al. (2003), where given policy, PSE is
unique. Instead, their framework generates multiple solutions to the MA’s problem that are rationalized by
private sector expectations. See their paper and King and Wolman (2004) for discussion.
13where the one-period ahead sticky price, ¯ p00, is given by the decision rule (4) with z =
z0 =0 . Hence, the weight can be viewed as a function of the sticky price, the PS state,
and beliefs about future money growth: γ = γ (¯ p0;¯ p,X;χ). For now I ignore the issue of
how expectations are coordinated in the current period; the point is to determine when
this matters by viewing equation (6) as a function of ¯ p0 with potentially multiple solutions.
However, the coordination of expectations in the future matters for ¯ p0,v i at h ee ﬀect of ¯ p00
on γ. This relevance of future expectations on current period behavior is discussed shortly.
Following KW, I interpret equation (6) as the best response function for an individual
ﬁrm: given (¯ p,X) and χ, this maps out the optimal price for ﬁrm i, ¯ p0
i, as a function of the
price of all other price-setting ﬁrms, ¯ p0
j, for all j ∈ [0,1], j 6= i.S p e c i ﬁcally:
¯ p0
i ≡ f
¡
¯ p0
j;¯ p,X;χ
¢
= ˆ λ
©£
1 − γ
¡
¯ p0
j;¯ p,X;χ
¢¤
ψ + γ
¡
¯ p0
j;¯ p,X;χ
¢
χ
¡
¯ p0
j
¢
ψ
ª
. (7)
Firm i’s optimal price depends on the price set by all other ﬁrms j through two channels:
(1) future marginal cost, via the eﬀect of ¯ p0
j on future money growth, χ; and (2) the relative
weight placed on future marginal cost, via the eﬀect of ¯ p0
j on γ.P S Er e q u i r e s¯ p0
i =¯ p0
j.
If ∂f/∂¯ p0
j > 0, then there exists strategic complementarity: the higher is the price set
by other ﬁrms, the higher is the optimal price for any individual ﬁrm (see Cooper and
John, 1988). If this complementarity is suﬃciently strong, there may be multiple crossings
of equation (7) with the 45◦-line, and hence, multiple equilibria. Whether this is the case
depends wholly on the policy rule, χ.
As a benchmark, consider χ(¯ p) ≡ 1, the case in which the MA always delivers zero
money growth. This corresponds to the ﬁrst-best policy achieved under commitment (see
King and Wolman, 1999).12 Since future money growth does not respond to current price-
setting, marginal cost is constant across periods (W0/W = χ(¯ p)=1 ). Regardless of the
price set by other ﬁrms, an individual ﬁrm’s best response is simply the static markup rule,
12The intuition is straightforward. ‘Money demand’ distortions associated with inﬂation greater than
t h eF r i e d m a nR u l ea r ee l i m i n a t e db yt h es u b s i d y ,θ. With commitment, the MA has no inﬂuence on the
monopoly distortion since inﬂation is perfectly anticipated. Hence, the only distortion aﬀected by policy is
the relative price distortion; this is eliminated with zero inﬂation (zero money growth).
14¯ p0
i ≡ f
³
¯ p0
j;¯ p,X;χ
´
= ˆ λψ. With zero money growth there is no complementarity. This is
displayed in Figure 2. In this case, how expectations are coordinated is not relevant.
As a second example, consider the case when money growth is an increasing, linear
function of prices, χ(¯ p)=a0 + a1¯ p, a1 > 0.A sﬁrms set higher prices, ¯ p0
j, future marginal
cost, χ
³
¯ p0
j
´
ψ,r i s e s . M o r e o v e r ,a sχ rises, γ → 1, so that the relative weight on future
marginal cost rises too. The optimal price for a ﬁrm is increasing in the price set by
other ﬁrms. Complementarity exists because the policy rule responds positively to — or
accommodates — the pricing decision of ﬁrms.
In Figure 3, I illustrate this for χ(¯ p)=0 .302 × ¯ p.13 Consider either the solid line or
the dashed line. The best response function ﬁrst crosses the 45◦-line from above. As ¯ p0
j
increases so too does the slope; the slope eventually exceeds one so there is a second crossing
of the 45◦-line from below. Because γ → 1 as ¯ p0
j rises, and because ∂χ/∂¯ p = a1:
lim
¯ p0
j→∞
∂f/∂¯ p0
j = ˆ λψa1.
Hence, when the MA’s policy rule is linear, a necessary condition for multiplicity is that
ˆ λψa1 > 1.14 Moreover, when multiple crossings exist, there are exactly two of them: an
optimistic equilibrium with current expectations coordinated on low inﬂation (and actions
coordinated on low price-setting), and a pessimistic equilibrium with current expectations
coordinated on high inﬂation.
Also, the best response function depends on how expectations are coordinated in the
future. This is because the relative weight, γ, depends on the sticky price set next period,
¯ p00; ¯ p00 in turn depends on ¯ p000, and so on. Hence, private sector agents must understand
which equilibrium will prevail today and in all subsequent periods.
This is illustrated in Figure 3. The solid line displays the best response function when
future sticky prices are determined by the decision rule, P,w i t hζ =l o . If agents expect low
inﬂation today, this results in the crossing marked with the diamond. Given that ζ deﬁnes
13Here are some numerical details with additional discussion contained in Appendix A. I set β =0 .98,
λ =1 1 ,a n dψ so that hss =0 .3 in the zero-inﬂation steady state.
14This is not suﬃcient since it is possible that (7) lies everywhere above the 45
◦-line, so that no PSE exist.
15constant expectations coordination over time, this is a PSE since it applies the same decision
rule used in the future to the current period; that is, at this crossing, ¯ p0 = f (¯ p0;¯ p,X;χ)=
P(¯ p,X;χ,lo).15 The dashed line displays the best response function when future prices are
determined by P with ζ =h i ; for these beliefs, the PSE is marked with the square.
Finally, Figure 4 illustrates that the exact number of crossings depends on the shape
of the policy rule χ. Here, ∂2χ/∂¯ p2 is initially positive, but beyond an inﬂection point is
negative. As a result, the number of crossings is three. Figure 4 displays the best response
function when future expectations are coordinated on the lowest inﬂation equilibrium.
4.2. Discussion
Before proceeding, I provide a few comments on the source of complementarity. First,
when attention is turned to monetary discretion, the policy rule will be an increasing func-
tion of the normalized sticky price. That is, a benevolent MA will ﬁnd it optimal to
accommodate the private sector’s expectations and pricing decisions.
Second, it is insightful to contrast the strategic complementarity highlighted here and
that discussed in Ball and Romer (1991). There are three key diﬀerences. First, in Ball
and Romer the complementarity arises due to endogenous price rigidity, in particular, the
decision of ﬁrms to alter prices in a state-contingent manner. Here, the complementarity
operates through the exogenously rigid two-period Taylor price. Second, Ball and Romer’s
model is static, and the complementarity operates through a feedback of current price-
setting, through current marginal cost, into the pricing decision of individual ﬁrms. Here,
current (normalized) marginal cost is pinned down as ψ, but future marginal cost, χ(¯ p0)ψ,
responds via the increasing function, χ. The last and most important diﬀerence is that in
Ball and Romer, the feedback on pricing decisions is due to real rigidity in marginal cost.
Here, ﬁrms’ expectations about other ﬁrms’ actions, and — crucially — the accommodative
monetary policy response to those actions, feeds back into pricing decisions.
15The second crossing of the solid line with the 45
◦-line represents a PSE with expectations changing
over time. Here, agents understand that the high inﬂation equilibrium prevails today, but the low inﬂation
equilibrium will prevail for all future periods.
16Finally, an important element to the complementarity is the eﬀect of price-setting on the
relative weight placed on future marginal cost. As ﬁrms raise prices, future marginal cost
rises and an individual ﬁrm cares more about the future in its price-setting. This is because
the ﬁrm’s proﬁt function is asymmetric across having a relative price that is too high versus
one that is too low. This asymmetry is discussed in detail in Devereux and Siu (2005), and
can be understood through the following extreme, but intuitive thought experiment.
Suppose future money growth, χ
³
¯ p0
j
´
, is high. Further, suppose ﬁrm i must decide
between pricing as a markup over current marginal cost, ¯ p0
i = ˆ λψ, or future marginal cost,
¯ p0
i = ˆ λχ
³
¯ p0
j
´
ψ. In either case, it earns static optimal proﬁts in one of the two periods.
By choosing the latter price, the ﬁrm earns optimal proﬁts in the second period, but its
current price is high relative to ﬁrms that set their price in the previous period. As a result,
the ﬁrm’s ﬁrst period demand and proﬁt will be low, but bounded above zero. Now suppose
the ﬁrm prices to current marginal cost; it earns optimal proﬁts in the ﬁrst period, but its
future relative price will be low. This implies that the ﬁrm’s second period demand will
be high, in the same period when its proﬁt margin is negative (at least for suﬃciently high
marginal cost growth).
Hence, the ﬁrm prefers to set a price that is too high relative to one that is too low; the
ﬁrm sacriﬁces current proﬁt to ensure non-negative proﬁts in the future. It is this relative
price eﬀect on a ﬁrm’s demand that makes the weight, γ,i n c r e a s i n gi n¯ p0.16 As long as
the policy rule, χ,i si n c r e a s i n gi n¯ p,t h ea s y m m e t r yi np r o ﬁts acts as a force for strategic
complementarity in price-setting behavior.
4.3. The Case with Endogenous Price Rigidity
With exogenous price rigidity the only action ﬁrms can take to guard against high future
inﬂation is to set a high price in the present. However, it is plausible to think that there
are other defensive actions ﬁrms take when faced with high inﬂation. One is to reset prices
16Of course, this example is extreme since any ﬁrm, given the opportunity, would shut down rather than
meet demand at a negative proﬁt margin. However, the intuition holds for any positive value of money
growth. Again, see Devereux and Siu (2005) for discussion.
17more often so that at any point in time, prices are more ‘in line’ with aggregate conditions.
Here, I consider a simple example to illustrate that the fraction of ﬁrms choosing ﬂexibility
increases with expected future inﬂation.17
Let the MA’s policy rule be χ(¯ p,z)=0 .302 × ¯ p, and let the ﬁxed cost of price change
be uniformly distributed, F (φ)=U [0,φ max].F o rd i ﬀerent values of the two-period price,
¯ p0
j, I use the cut-oﬀ condition (5) to determine the fraction of ﬁrms that prefer ﬂexibility,
z0, as opposed to charging ¯ p0
j. Then the FONC (4) is used to determine the best response
sticky price, ¯ p0
i. Figure 5 plots ¯ p0
i and z0 for two values of φmax:t h eﬁrst column sets the
maximal ﬁxed cost to 20% of per-period ﬁrm revenue in the zero-inﬂation steady state, and
the second column sets this to 10%. For simplicity, I plot only the case when agents expect
the low inﬂation equilibrium in future periods. Remaining parameter values are as speciﬁed
in Subsection 4.1, and details on computation are in Appendix A.
Allowing for endogenous price rigidity does not qualitatively change the best response
function. There are two crossings of the 45◦-line. The ﬁrst is optimistic, featuring expecta-
tions of low inﬂation and a small degree of price ﬂexibility; the second is pessimistic, with
expectations of high inﬂation and greater ﬂexibility. As φmax falls, an increasing number of
ﬁrms choose to be ﬂexible for given future inﬂation, as shown in the second column. For
suﬃciently high values of inﬂation, all ﬁrms choose ﬂexibility, z0 =1 .A tt h i sp o i n tt h eb e s t
response function ceases to be ‘relevant’ since no ﬁrms actually set sticky prices.18
5. A MAXIMIZING MONETARY AUTHORITY
The MA’s objective is to maximize the present discounted value of household utility
from the current period forward through the choice of current money growth, X.T h eM A
takes past decisions and its future incarnation’s policy rule, χ, as given and beyond its
17See also Devereux (1987) for a model which considers the eﬀect of monetary variability on the endogenous
degree of wage indexation, and its impact on discretionary monetary policy.
18This makes interpretation of the policy rule, χ(¯ p), in this example somewhat diﬃc u l t .T h i si sn ol o n g e r
a problem when I consider a maximizing policy authority whose rule, χ(¯ p,z), is a function of both sticky
prices and the fraction of ﬁrms charging that price. See Section 6.
18control. This is the expression of the time-consistency problem as articulated by Kydland
and Prescott (1977): the current MA is unable to compel its future self to appropriately
account for the eﬀect of its policy on current private sector expectations and decisions.
Here, the time-consistency problem takes on an added dimension. Current private sector
behavior depends on expectations of future policy, given by χ. But certain policy rules
admit multiple PSE. This implies that the current MA must also take the coordination of
expectations as given. In its policy problem, the MA is ‘trapped’ by inﬂation expectations.
T h eM A ’ sp r o b l e mc a nb es t a t e da sf o l l o w s :
max
X
£
U (s,X;χ,ζ)+βU
¡
s0,χ
¡
s0¢
;χ,ζ
¢
+ β2U
¡
s00,χ
¡
s00¢
;χ,ζ
¢
+ ...
¤
, ∀s ∈ σ,
taking as given χ and ζ. Here: s =(¯ p,z), U (s,X;χ,ζ)=l o gc(s,X;χ,ζ) − ψh(s,X;χ,ζ),
s0 =( P ( s,X;χ,ζ),Z(s,X;χ,ζ)),a n ds oo n ;P(.) and Z(.) are deﬁned by equations (4)
and (5); and c(.) and h(.) are deﬁned by equations (2) and (3). A MPE can be deﬁned as
aP S Ea n dap o l i c yr u l e ,χ : σ → R+, that solves the MA’s problem. The MPE policy rule,
χ(s;ζ),d i ﬀe r sa c r o s sv a l u e so fζ since the MA takes expectation coordination as given.
Here, I consider an alternative deﬁnition of MPE and derive the generalized Euler equation
(GEE), both of which are due to Klein et al. (2004).19
Deﬁnition 3 Given ζ,aMarkov perfect equilibrium consists of a value function, V ;d e c i -
sion rules, P and Z;a n dap o l i c yr u l e ,χ, such that for all s =(¯ p,z) ∈ σ:
• given χ(s;ζ), P(s,X;χ,ζ) and Z(s,X;χ,ζ) are the PSE decision rules characterized
in Proposition 2;
• given P(s,X;χ,ζ), Z(s,X;χ,ζ),a n dV (s;ζ):
χ(s;ζ) ∈ argmax
X
[U (s,X;χ,ζ)+βV (P(s,X;χ,ζ),Z(s,X;χ,ζ);ζ)];
• given P(s,X;χ,ζ), Z(s,X;χ,ζ),a n dχ(s;ζ):
V (s;ζ)=U (s,χ(s;ζ);χ,ζ)+βV (P(s,χ(s);χ,ζ),Z(s,χ(s);χ,ζ);ζ).
19For a related deﬁnition of time consistent equilibrium, see the appendix of Kydland and Prescott (1977).
I thank Victor Rios-Rull for bringing this to my attention.
19To conserve on notation, I do not index V by χ, since this is obvious; the value function
is constructed using private sector decision rules which: (i) depend on (are indexed by)
χ, and (ii) take the current period money growth rate as χ(s,ζ). This last restriction is
correct, since the value function is used by the current MA in evaluating future welfare,
taking future policy as given by χ.T h i s d e ﬁnition concisely captures the notion of time
consistency: the policy rule attributed to the choice of money growth by the future MA
coincides with the optimizing choice of current money growth for all s ∈ σ,g i v e nζ.
The GEE is the FONC associated with MA optimization. This is useful both for inter-
pretation and computation (see Appendix B). Wherever the policy and decision rules are
diﬀerentiable, X must solve:
UcCX + UhHX + β
¡
V 0
¯ pPX + V 0
zZX
¢
=0 , (8)
where
CX = cX + c¯ p0PX + cz0ZX,
HX = hX + h¯ p0PX + hz0ZX,
for all s ∈ σ,g i v e nζ. Here, V 0
¯ p represents the derivative of the one-period ahead value
function with respect to its ﬁrst argument, and V 0
z with respect to the second. Likewise, ci
represents the derivative of the consumption allocation rule with respect to i,f o ri = {X,
¯ p0, z0},a n ds i m i l a r l yf o rhi.
To express the GEE in terms of primitives, note from the deﬁnition of the value function:
V 0
¯ p = U0
cC0
¯ p + U0
hH0
¯ p + β
¡
V 00
¯ p P0
¯ p + V 00
z Z0
¯ p
¢
.
To simplify this expression, rearrange equation (8) to obtain:
β
¡
V 00
¯ p P0
¯ p + V 00
z Z0
¯ p
¢
= −X0
¯ p0
¡
U0
cC0
X + U0
hH0
X
¢
,
where X0 = χ(¯ p0,z0).A sar e s u l t :
V 0
¯ p = U0
cC0
¯ p + U0
hH0
¯ p −
P0
¯ p
P0
X
¡
U0
cC0
X + U0
hH0
X
¢
.
20Manipulating V 0
z in the same way and substituting, the GEE becomes:
UcCX + UhHX + βPX
∙
U0
cC0
¯ p + U0
hH0
¯ p −
P0
¯ p
P0
X
¡
U0
cC0
X + U0
hH0
X
¢¸
+
βZX
∙
U0
cC0
z + U0
hH0
z −
Z0
z
Z0
X
¡
U0
cC0
X + U0
hH0
X
¢¸
=0 . (9)
From a variational perspective, the MA’s policy choice aﬀects current and one-period
ahead utility; these marginal eﬀects sum to zero at an optimum. In the current period,
m o n e yg r o w t ha ﬀects the utility value of consumption via UcCX. This involves both direct
and indirect eﬀects. The direct eﬀect, cX, captures the erosion of the inherited normalized
price, ¯ p.T h i s a ﬀects both the monopoly pricing distortion, and, for given ¯ p0 and z0,t h e
relative price distortion across ﬁrms. The terms c¯ p0PX and cz0ZX capture the indirect eﬀects
on current pricing decisions, and hence, on the relative price distortion. Similarly, UhHX
captures the direct and indirect eﬀects of current money growth on the utility value of labor.
The remaining terms in equation (9) represent the eﬀect of current policy on the future
via the future state, s0 =( ¯ p0,z0).T h eﬁrst term involving square brackets, βPX [···],c a n
be split into two eﬀects. The ﬁrst is the indirect eﬀect of the change in the future sticky
price, PX, on future utility values of consumption and labor, U0
cC0
¯ p and U0
hH0
¯ p.20 The second
is the induced eﬀect of a change in current policy on future policy. The term:
PX
P0
¯ p
P0
X
=
∂¯ p0
∂X
∂X0
∂¯ p0 =
∂X0
∂X
.
Hence, this reﬂects the change in future money growth due to current money growth’s
inﬂuence on the sticky price, ¯ p0. Similarly, the second square bracket term reﬂects the
indirect and induced policy eﬀects of X on the future via the fraction of ﬂexible prices, z0.
Note that the GEE must be satisﬁed wherever policy and decision rules are diﬀerentiable.
However, there is no reason to restrict attention to policy rules that are continuous when
z =1 .W i t h f u l l p r i c e ﬂexibility, the current MA is indiﬀerent between all values of X
since money is neutral. In the following section, I discuss how outcomes can diﬀer when a
discontinuity in the policy rule is allowed at z =1 . In Section 7, I consider an arbitrarily
20These, in turn, involve direct and indirect eﬀects via C
0
¯ p and H
0
¯ p, analogous to those described above.
21small perturbation of the model that implies that the optimal policy rule is necessarily
discontinuous at z =1 . This results in unique MPE.
6. ANALYZING MARKOV PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM
Here I study MPE in calibrated versions of the model of Section 2. In Subsection 6.1,
attention is restricted to diﬀerentiable policy rules. The ﬁrst objective is to illustrate that
two MPE exist. The second is to characterize the degree of price rigidity in the high inﬂation
equilibrium. Subsection 6.2 considers the case with policy rules discontinuous at z =1 .21
The model calibration is standard. The period length is taken to be six months, so that
no ﬁrm is forced to charge a price older than six months, even in the face of high inﬂation.
Is e tβ =0 .98 to accord with an annual risk-free real return of 4%. The demand elasticity
of substitution, λ, determines the strength of the strategic complementarity. As in much of
the sticky price literature, I choose λ =1 1as a benchmark value. This implies a price-to-
marginal-cost markup of 10% in the zero inﬂation steady state (see, for e.g., Chari et al.,
2000; Khan et al., 2003; KW; and Devereux and Siu, 2005). I also consider smaller values
of λ (higher markups) to capture the range of values used in the literature.22 The fraction
of time spent in market activity in the zero inﬂation steady state is hss =0 .3.
6.1. Analysis of the Diﬀerentiable Case
I ﬁrst consider the play of diﬀerentiable policy rules in which:
χ(¯ p,1;ζ)=l i m
z→1
χ(¯ p,z;ζ), ∀¯ p,
despite the fact that the MA is indiﬀerent between all values of X at full price ﬂexibility.
To make this operational, I solve for MPE by approximating the MA’s policy rule by a
21Again, I consider cases where expectations are coordinated on either the optimistic or pessimistic equi-
librium occurring in all periods. Equilibria in which expectations ﬂuctuate across low and high inﬂation can
be constructed (see footnote 8). Since the emphasis of this paper is to show that the pessimistic equilibrium
is fragile, I do not analyze this possibility.
22For instance, λ =4 .33 in Dotsey et al. (1999), and λ =3 .22 in Christiano et al. (2005).
22tensor product of Chebychev polynomials, which is diﬀerentiable by construction. I outline
the algorithm developed to solve for MPE in Appendix B.
6.1.1. Exogenous price rigidity When the ﬁx e dc o s td i s t r i b u t i o ni sd e g e n e r a t ea t
inﬁnity, no ﬁrm chooses to reset its price more frequently than once a year. Results from
this version can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 4 With exogenous price rigidity, the MPE policy rule, χ(¯ p),i sp r o p o r t i o n a l
in ¯ p. Hence, two locally isolated MPE exist: an optimistic equilibrium with low expected
a n dr e a l i z e di n ﬂ a t i o n ,a n dap e s s i m i s t i ce q u i l i b r i u mw i t hh i g hi n ﬂ a t i o n .
Discussion of this result is contained in KW, in their characterization of a homogenous
money stock rule. The intuition is straightforward. From the PSE decision rules, (2) — (3),
the direct eﬀect of money growth on real outcomes is in direct proportion to the level of
normalized preset prices, ¯ p.M o r e o v e r ,¯ p0 or z0 depend on money growth only via its eﬀect
on the normalized price level, p, where again, the eﬀect is proportional to ¯ p.A sar e s u l t ,
optimal money growth, χ(¯ p), is proportional to ¯ p.
Given this linearity, Subsection 4.1 shows that the number of PSE is exactly two. As a
result, there are exactly two MPE, so that ζ ∈ {lo,hi}. In the steady state of the optimistic
MPE, the inﬂation rate is 1.9% per period (3.8% per year), while real output is 0.04% lower
than in the zero inﬂation (ﬁrst best) steady state. In the pessimistic MPE steady state,
inﬂa t i o ni sm u c hh i g h e ra t13.8% per period, and output is 1.91% lower than with zero
inﬂation. Hence, the pessimistic equilibrium can be interpreted as stagﬂation relative to
the optimistic equilibrium.
6.1.2. Endogenous price rigidity Here I consider a distribution of the ﬁxed cost with
bounded support, [0,φ max]. For the sake of computation, I choose F to be uniform, though
the exact speciﬁcation is irrelevant to the results (see below).
From the GEE (9), the MA’s policy choice generates dynamic eﬀects through its inﬂuence
on the future MA state, s0 =( ¯ p0,z0).T h e s e e ﬀects (in particular, the fact that ZX 6=
230) makes an analytical characterization of the optimal policy rule, χ(¯ p,z;ζ), infeasible.
Instead, I characterize χ numerically using the iterative algorithm of Appendix B. For a
given ζ, the solution method converges to a unique MPE policy rule. This policy rule is a
non-linear function of the fraction of ﬂexible price ﬁrms, z, but is proportional in the sticky
price, ¯ p.23 Again, the intuition is straightforward, since money growth appears in the PSE
decision rules in direct proportion to ¯ p. Hence, two MPE exist, indexed by expectations.
The fraction of ﬂexible price ﬁrms obviously increases with the inﬂation rate. The goal
is to determine whether — for quantitatively reasonable values of φmax — prices are fully
ﬂexible in the steady state of the pessimistic, high inﬂation MPE.24
To this end, I compute the pessimistic MPE for various values of φmax and ﬁnd the largest
value such that the steady state displays full price ﬂexibility. That is, I ﬁnd the value —
call it ˆ φmax — such that for all ﬁxed cost distributions, F,w i t hφmax ≤ ˆ φmax, z =1in the
steady state of the pessimistic MPE; for all F with φmax > ˆ φmax, z<1.H e n c e ,t h es h a p e
of F is irrelevant for ﬁnding ˆ φmax;i fa l lﬁrms choose to incur the ﬁxed cost, φi ∈ [0,φ max],
for φmax ≤ ˆ φmax, the exact distribution of those costs across ﬁrms does not matter.
Figure 6 plots the value of ˆ φmax for various values of λ. For the baseline calibration of
λ =1 1 , ˆ φmax =8 .9% of semi-annual steady state ﬁrm revenue; i.e., as long as the cost of a
single price change is less than 8.9% of semi-annual revenue, all ﬁrms choose to incur it and
the steady state of the high inﬂation equilibrium exhibits full price ﬂexibility. As λ falls,
so that the steady state markup increases, the cut-oﬀ value increases. For instance, when
23This is true regardless of the extent of non-linearity in the initial guess of the policy rule used as a
starting point in the solution algorithm.
24Note that this is inherently a quantitative issue. That is, it cannot be that, for any ﬁnite value of φmax,
a pessimistic MPE exists with full ﬂexibility. To see this, compare the diﬀerence in gross proﬁts from being
ﬂexible relative to being sticky, versus the value of φmax.F l e x i b l e p r i c e p r o ﬁts are simply the discounted
two-period sum of static monopoly proﬁts. For any future money growth rate, there is a ﬁnite lower bound
on sticky price proﬁts: a ﬁrm can always set its two-period price as an optimal markup over future marginal
cost, and earn static monopoly proﬁts in the second period of its price contract. The worst that can happen
in the ﬁrst period is that the ﬁrm’s relative price is so high that it generates zero demand and earns zero
proﬁt. Hence, the diﬀerence between ﬂexible and sticky price proﬁt si sb o u n d e d .S oa sl o n ga st h em a x i m a l
ﬁxed cost is greater than this bounded diﬀerence, full price ﬂexibility cannot be an equilibrium.
24the markup is calibrated to 25% (λ =5 ), the cut-oﬀ value is ˆ φmax =1 6 .4% of semi-annual
revenue, and when the markup is 35% (λ =3 .85), ˆ φmax =1 8 .9%.
To understand this, note that as λ decreases, so too does the strength of the strategic
complementarity: intermediate goods become less substitutable, so a ﬁrm’s optimal price
becomes less sensitive to others’ prices. For a pessimistic MPE to exist, it must exist
at higher levels of money growth and inﬂation. At higher inﬂation, the greater is the
beneﬁtt oc h o o s i n gﬂexibility, and the greater is the degree of ﬂexibility for a given ﬁxed
cost distribution. So as λ decreases, the range of φmax values for which pessimistic MPE
displays full price ﬂexibility increases.
Recall that the ﬁxed cost, φ, corresponds to the ﬁrm’s incremental cost of one additional
price change. As such, the magnitude of ˆ φmax values in Figure 6 is large. It is much
larger than those used in monetary business cycle models with state-dependent pricing. For
instance, Dotsey et al. (1999) consider a value of φmax equivalent to 1.5% of semi-annual
steady state ﬁrm revenue, while Devereux and Siu (2005) consider a value of 2.85%.
More importantly, the magnitude of ˆ φmax is much larger than direct measures of the
cost of a single price change. Zbaracki et al. (2004) is the leading study. They track
the price-setting process of a multi-product manufacturing ﬁrm and quantify all ﬁxed costs
associated with the issuance of the ﬁrm’s price list — managerial (information-processing,
decision-making), customer (communication, renegotiation), and physical ‘menu’ costs. At
a semi-annual frequency, this comes to 2.5% of the ﬁrm’s revenue. It is clearly diﬃcult
to extrapolate based upon this single observation. For instance, it could be argued that
Zbaracki et al.’s measure generates downward bias for inference of φmax, due to selection: by
necessity, they study a ﬁrm that is willing to make annual price revisions in a low inﬂation
environment. It is also easy to argue for upward bias. During periods of high inﬂation,
it is likely that many of the tasks documented by Zbaracki et al. (market research, sales
trips made expressly to communicate new prices, printing of price lists) would be made
routine, less costly, or all-together eliminated. Hence, the relevant incremental cost of a
price change, as it pertains to high inﬂation expectation traps, may be much smaller.
Nonetheless, the model’s results for the size of ˆ φmax are multiple times greater than
25the calibrated and measured values discussed above. Hence, it seems likely that for any
reasonable magnitude of φmax, prices are fully ﬂexible in the high inﬂation equilibrium.
Finally, real output is actually higher in the pessimistic MPE than in the optimistic one.
In the optimistic steady state, prices are less than fully ﬂexible, and output is lower than in
the zero inﬂation ﬁrst-best. This is because in MPE, all inﬂation is perfectly forecasted. As
a result, the output gains due to inﬂation’s eﬀect on the monopoly distortion are outweighed
by the losses due to the relative price distortion. But because prices are fully ﬂexible in the
pessimistic case, output is identical to that of the zero inﬂation steady state.25 Hence, the
predictions for real outcomes are opposite to those from the model with exogenous price
rigidity. This belies the interpretation of pessimism as periods of stagﬂation.
6.2. Allowing for a Discontinuity in the Policy Rule
When the MA inherits no sticky prices, current money growth has no real eﬀect and the
MA is indiﬀerent between all values of X. This strict indiﬀerence opens up the possibility
for a rich set of pessimistic MPE.
Since the principal objective is to demonstrate the fragility of self-fulﬁlling high inﬂation
equilibria, I provide brief description here, with more detailed analysis in Appendix C.
Consider the following discontinuous policy rule:
ˆ χ(¯ p,z;ζ)=
⎧
⎨
⎩
χ(¯ p,z;ζ) for all ¯ p and z<1
ˆ X for all ¯ p and z =1
, (10)
where χ(¯ p,z;ζ) is the diﬀerentiable MPE policy rule of Subsection 6.1 and ˆ X ≥ β.O b -
viously this rule is optimal for the MA: for all z<1, this rule coincides with the original
MPE rule; at z =1 ,a n yv a l u eo f ˆ X is optimal by indiﬀerence.
To ensure this is a MPE policy rule, all that needs to be checked is that private sector
best responses constitute equilibrium behavior. For all z<1,r u l e( 1 0 )c o i n c i d e sw i t ht h e
25Moreover, hours worked is greater in the pessimistic case relative to zero inﬂation since, in order to
achieve full ﬂexibility, labor input must be devoted to price change. Finally, note that when ﬂexibility is less
than full, the speciﬁcation of F will matter for real variables via the equilibrium value of z.
26original MPE rule, so the decision rules, P and Z given by (4) and (5), are optimal by
deﬁnition. At z =1 , pricing decisions are independent of current money growth. To ensure
equilibrium, all that needs to be checked is that all ﬁrms that chose ﬂexibility in the previous
period under the original policy rule continue to do so under rule (10). That is, it must be
that at z =1 ,n oﬁrm that chose ﬂexibility ﬁnds it proﬁtable to deviate to stickiness.
Since ﬁrms are diﬀerentiated only by their ﬁxed cost, it suﬃces to check this for the ﬁrm
with the highest ﬁxed cost, φi = φmax. The proﬁtability of such a deviation depends on the
value of ˆ X. For example, it cannot be that ˆ X =1 . With zero money growth, a ﬁrm could
set a sticky price as an optimal markup over constant current and future marginal cost, and
earn gross proﬁts identical to those under ﬂexible prices. Since this saves on the ﬁxed cost,
any ﬁrm would deviate to being sticky. For rule (10) to constitute a MPE policy rule, ˆ X
must be large enough to ensure that the φi = φmax ﬁrm continues to choose ﬂexibility.
The MA’s indiﬀerence at full ﬂexibility also allows for mixed strategy policy rules. For
instance, it is possible that when z =1 , the MA generates positive money growth, ˆ Xδ > 1,
with probability δ<1, and zero money growth otherwise. For this to constitute a MPE, the
mixing probability must be suﬃciently large (see Appendix C). Let δmin denote the smallest
feasible mixing probability. Then for each δ ≥ δmin, there is a smallest feasible money growth
rate — call this ˆ Xmin
δ — ensuring that no ﬁrm deviates from ﬂexibility to stickiness. The exact
characterizations of δmin and ˆ Xmin
δ are in Appendix C. Here I summarize as follows:
Proposition 5 Let δ ∈
£
δmin,1
¤
,w h e r eδmin is deﬁned in (15). Then for ˆ Xδ ∈
h
ˆ Xmin
δ ,∞
´
,
the discontinuous, mixed strategy policy rule (14) is a MPE policy rule.
This makes it clear that pessimistic equilibria can diﬀer drastically across exogenous and
endogenous price rigidity models. With exogenous price rigidity, pessimism is reﬂected in
a unique, high value of equilibrium inﬂation. But with endogenous rigidity, a continuum
of inﬂation rates can occur. Finally, it is worth noting that across all of these pessimistic
MPE, real outcomes are identical to the case with a diﬀerentiable policy rule. The only
diﬀerence across equilibria is in inﬂation rates.
277. A MODEL WITH UNIQUE EQUILIBRIUM
In the simpliﬁed model presented above, monetary policy aﬀects real variables only when
some prices are sticky. When prices are fully ﬂexible, the MA is indiﬀerent between all
values of X. Here, I consider an arbitrarily small perturbation to the model to break the
MA’s indiﬀerence. I introduce a non-zero cost of inﬂation that is present even when prices
are fully ﬂexible. This implies that equilibrium cannot exist with full ﬂexibility.
In particular, suppose there is an arbitrarily small resource cost of money creation, g =
ε|X − 1|, ε>0. That is, printing (or shredding) money is costly in terms of ﬁnal goods. The
MA ﬁnances money creation via lump-sum taxation, so that the MA’s budget constraint is:
Tt = Mt − Mt−1 − θt−1
µ
Wt−1ht−1 +
Z 1
0
Πi,t−1di
¶
− Pt−1gt−1, ∀t.
The modiﬁed model’s aggregate resource constraint is now:
c + g = y.
The rest of the model description is identical to Section 2. Apart from its eﬀect via sticky
prices, X has a direct eﬀect on the fraction of output available for consumption. So when
prices are fully ﬂexible, the maximizing MA sets X =1in order to minimize printing costs.
This strict preference for zero money growth at full ﬂexibility introduces an obvious
deviation for ﬁrms choosing ﬂexibility. Suppose z =1so that X =1 .G i v e n z e r o m o n e y
growth, an individual ﬁrm considering a deviation to stickiness would set a sticky price as
a markup over constant current and future marginal cost, ¯ p0 =˜ p = ˆ λψ.T h e ﬁrm would
earn identical gross proﬁts by choosing stickiness relative to choosing ﬂexibility, but without
incurring the ﬁxed cost. As a result, any ﬁrm would deviate to stickiness, meaning that
z 6=1 . No equilibrium exists with fully ﬂexible prices.
The analysis of Section 6 indicates that in the unmodiﬁed model, for quantitatively
reasonable speciﬁcations of the ﬁxed cost of price change, prices are fully ﬂexible in the
pessimistic MPE. Hence, allowing for a cost of inﬂation independent of rigid prices implies
that pessimistic equilibria do not exist. This cost need only be arbitrarily small. For
28reasonable quantitative speciﬁcations, the modiﬁed model predicts a unique low inﬂation
MPE, so there is no multiplicity.
7.1. Discussion
There are many ways to introduce a cost of inﬂation that is present with fully ﬂexible
prices, without changing the nature of the analysis. I discuss two possibilities. First,
the cash-in-advance model considered here adopts Lucas’ (1982) timing of events within a
period. Hence, any ‘money demand’ distortion is due to expected future inﬂation, which
c a n n o tb ei n ﬂuenced by the MA under discretion. But in a model with Svensson’s (1985)
timing, realized current inﬂation is costly since households use previously accumulated cash
to conduct transactions. This type of portfolio rigidity is unrelated to price rigidity. Hence,
Svensson’s timing would make current inﬂa t i o nc o s t l ye v e nw i t hﬂexible prices (for analysis
of this cost in the context of monetary discretion, see Albanesi et al., 2001 and 2003).
A second way to modify the model is to change the timing of pricing decisions to more
closely resemble a state-dependent pricing (SDP) model. In the model of Section 2, ﬁrms
make their pricing decision before the realization of future inﬂation, i.e. in the ﬁrst period
of the two-period Taylor contract. In a SDP interpretation, the decision is made after
observing future inﬂation, i.e. in the second period.26 Given perfect foresight, ﬁrms in
the SDP version know ex-ante whether they will be changing their price ex-post and set
ﬁrst period prices accordingly. Hence, analysis of the two versions is virtually identical as
long as z<1.27 But a critical diﬀerence arises when z =1 , precisely because the ﬁrm’s
decision to incur the ﬁxed cost is made ex-post. Now, the MA’s choice of money growth
26See Devereux and Siu (2005). Though more familiar to the sticky price literature, the SDP version is
notationally burdensome, complicating exposition. One needs to deﬁne an additional variable, κ
0,w h i c h
measures the current period’s expected fraction of ﬁrms that choose price ﬂexibility in the following period.
Equilibrium requires κ
0 = z
0. Details are available upon request.
27The only diﬀerence is that in making its policy choice, the MA accounts for the cost of labor resources
devoted to price change (in addition to the cost associated with relative price distortions) when realized
inﬂation is positive. Since the cost of price change is small (for plausible speciﬁcations of φmax), this
diﬀerence is quantitatively unimportant.
29has a direct impact on the fraction of labor resources devoted to price change. Suppose all
ﬁrms expect high inﬂation and set ﬁrst period prices anticipating that they will be resetting
them in the next period. If all ﬁrms are resetting prices, the MA’s inﬂuence via rigid prices
is inoperative; the MA’s optimal choice is then to eliminate labor costs of price change by
choosing X =1 . Clearly, this is susceptible to the same deviation on the part of ﬁrms as
before. Expectations of high inﬂation with full price ﬂexibility cannot be validated, so that
self-fulﬁlling pessimistic MPE cannot exist for plausible ﬁxed costs.
8. CONCLUSION
In this paper I have characterized time consistent equilibrium in a model with monetary
discretion and an endogenously determined degree of price rigidity. The endogeneity is
introduced by allowing ﬁrms to determine their frequency of price change; more frequent
price change involves incurring a ﬁxed cost.
When welfare costs of realized inﬂation are present only with sticky prices, there exist two
time consistent equilibria: an optimistic equilibrium with low inﬂation, and a pessimistic
equilibrium with high inﬂation. This is in keeping with previous studies which assume
exogenously rigid prices. But for quantitatively reasonable speciﬁcations of the ﬁxed cost,
the pessimistic equilibrium displays full price ﬂexibility. When an arbitrarily small cost of
inﬂation exists independent of rigid prices, the pessimistic equilibrium is eliminated, and
time consistent equilibrium is unique.
This suggests that the fragility of expectation traps relying on sticky prices is not limited
to the framework studied here. As an example, consider a more elaborate speciﬁcation of
endogenous price rigidity, such as the state-dependent pricing (SDP) model of Dotsey et al.
(1999). In both environments, the fraction of ﬂexible prices is endogenous; however, with
SDP, the number of past prices or ‘vintages’ inherited at any point in time is endogenous,
while in the current two-period Taylor model, the number of past vintages is assumed to be
one. Crucially, this paper ﬁnds that in high inﬂation settings, all ﬁrms prefer to set ﬂexible
prices as opposed to maintaining a sticky price that has been eroded by only one period
30of inﬂation. Clearly, no ﬁrm would prefer to charge a price eroded by multiple periods of
inﬂation, so allowing for SDP would not impact on the analysis.
Finally, though attention has been restricted to Markov perfect equilibrium, the nature of
the results is likely to extend to environments in which the monetary authority’s reputation
matters. This is because the fragility of pessimistic equilibrium is due to optimizing behavior
of private sector agents. Any proposed history of events that entails expectations of high
inﬂation will result in ﬁrms opting for ﬂexible as opposed to sticky prices. Again, this
eliminates the monetary authority’s welfare trade-oﬀ in inﬂation due to price rigidity, leading
to the arguments considered here.28 Simply put, it seems problematic to formulate an
explanation for high inﬂation equilibria based on sticky prices since, in quantitative models,
ﬁrms choose not to charge sticky prices.
APPENDIX A
Figures 3 through 5 are constructed as follows. Given a policy rule, χ, I calculate the
steady state corresponding to the PSE when X ≡ χ(¯ p) for a given value of ζ.F i xav a l u eo f
ζ. The PS state is set to the corresponding steady state value, (¯ p,z,X)=(¯ pss,z ss,χ(¯ pss)).
I then consider a range of prices for ﬁrms setting a two-period price in the current period.
For each of these sticky prices, ¯ p0
j, the best response, ¯ p0
i,i sg i v e nb y :
¯ p0
i ≡ f
¡
¯ p0
j,z0;¯ p,z,X;χ
¢
= ˆ λψ
£¡
1 − γ
¡
¯ p0
j,z0;¯ p,z,X;χ
¢¢
+ γ
¡
¯ p0
j,z0;¯ p,z,X;χ
¢
χ
¡
¯ p0
j
¢¤
.
The relative weight on current versus future marginal cost must account for the fact that
some ﬁrms choose ﬂexibility. That is:
γ
¡
¯ p0
j,z0;¯ p,z,X;χ
¢
=
pλ−1
pλ−1 + βp0λ−1χ
³
¯ p0
j
´λ−1,
28An interesting open question is the characterization of sustainable equilibrium with endogenous price
rigidity. In particular, the possibility that prices cease to be sticky for suﬃciently high inﬂation can limit
the severity of the worst sustainable equilibrium. Hence, the conditions under which ﬁrst-best monetary
policies can be sustained by trigger strategies may diﬀer under endogenous and exogenous price rigidity.
31where
pλ−1 =
½
1
2
∙
(1 − z)
³ ¯ p
X
´1−λ
+
¡
1 − z0¢
¯ p01−λ
j +
¡
z + z0¢
˜ p1−λ
¸¾−1
,
p0λ−1 =
⎧
⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎩
1
2
⎡
⎢
⎣
¡
1 − z0¢
⎛
⎝ ¯ p0
j
χ
³
¯ p0
j
´
⎞
⎠
1−λ
+
¡
1 − z00¢
¯ p001−λ +
¡
z0 + z00¢
˜ p01−λ
⎤
⎥
⎦
⎫
⎪ ⎬
⎪ ⎭
−1
.
Here, ˜ p =˜ p0 = ˆ λψ,a n d¯ p00 =P
³
¯ p0
j,z0,χ
³
¯ p0
j
´
;χ,ζ
´
and z00 =Z
³
¯ p0
j,z0,χ
³
¯ p0
j
´
;χ,ζ
´
are
derived from the PSE decision rules. Determining ¯ p00 and z00 requires calculating ¯ p000, z000,
and so on; these are also derived according to P and Z.
For each ¯ p0
j,Iﬁnd z0 as the value that satisﬁes:
pλ−1
˜ pλ (˜ p − ψ)+β
∙
p0λ−1
˜ pλ (˜ p − ψ) − ψF−1 ¡
z0¢¸
=
pλ−1
¯ p0λ
j
¡
¯ p0
j − ψ
¢
+ βp0λ−1
⎛
⎝
χ
³
¯ p0
j
´
¯ p0
j
⎞
⎠
λ ⎛
⎝
¯ p0
j
χ
³
¯ p0
j
´ − ψ
⎞
⎠.
This is plotted in the bottom row of Figure 5. Using this value of z0,Ic a l c u l a t eγ,a n dt h e
best response price, ¯ p0
i. In Figures 3 and 4, z =0 , and determining z0 is not necessary.
APPENDIX B
The solution algorithm builds on a modiﬁed version of the MPE deﬁnition of Section 5.
This modiﬁcation is discussed in Klein et al. (2004), Subsection 3.2. Consider the following
statement of the MA’s problem:
max
¯ p0,z0,X
£
U (s,X;χ,ζ)+βV
¡
¯ p0,z0;ζ
¢¤
, (11)
subject to
M ≡
³
pλ−1 + βp0λ−1X0λ−1
´
¯ p0 − ˆ λψ
³
pλ−1 + βp0λ−1X0λ
´
=0 ,
N ≡
³
pλ−1 + βp0λ−1
´ ˜ p − ψ
˜ pλ − βψF−1 ¡
z0¢
−
∙
pλ−1 ¡
¯ p0 − ψ
¢
+ βp0λ−1X0λ
µ
¯ p0
X0 − ψ
¶¸
1
¯ p0λ ≥ 0,
32given ζ, for all s =(¯ p,z) ∈ σ,w i t hN =0whenever F−1 (z0) <ϕ max. Here, p = p(s,X;χ,ζ)
and p0 = p(s0,X0;χ,ζ) are the current and future normalized price levels given by the
pricing equation (1), X0 = χ(s0), s0 =( ¯ p0,z0),a n d˜ p = ˆ λψ.F i n a l l y , ¯ p00 = ˜ P(s0;χ,ζ)
and z00 = ˜ Z(s0;χ,ζ) are one-period ahead pricing decisions taking as given that future
money growth is determined according to χ(s0);t h a ti s ,˜ P(s;χ,ζ) ≡ P(s,χ(s);χ,ζ) and
˜ Z(s;χ,ζ) ≡ Z(s,χ(s);χ,ζ). MPE requires that, given ζ, the maximizing value of X for all
s coincides with χ(s;ζ). Furthermore, the solution to problem (11) coincides with V (s;ζ).
This formulation represents a computational saving relative to Deﬁnition 3 as the dimension
of the pricing decisions is reduced by one.
The GEE for problem (11) can be derived as follows. Let µ be the Lagrange multiplier
associated with constraint M,a n dν be the multiplier on constraint N.A t a n i n t e r i o r
solution, constraints M and N must be satisﬁed with equality, and the FONCs can be
rearranged to get:
UccX + UhhX + µMX + νNX =0 , (12)
where
µ = −
Ucc¯ p0 + Uhh¯ p0 + βV 0
¯ p − N¯ p0 (Uccz0 + Uhhz0 + βV 0
z)/Nz0
M¯ p0 − N¯ p0Mz0/Nz0
,
ν = −
¡
Uccz0 + Uhhz0 + βV 0
z + µMz0
¢
/Nz0.
Equation (12) is the GEE. This expression depends on derivatives of the value function
via the multipliers, as well as derivatives of the decision rules via the derivatives of the
constraints. For example:
Mz0 =( λ − 1)
h
pλ−2pz0 + βp0λ−2X0λ−1Ω + βp0λ−1X0λ−2χ0
z
i
−
ˆ λψ (λ − 1)
h
pλ−2pz0 + βp0λ−2X0λΩ + ˆ λβp0λ−1X0λ−1χ0
z
i
,
where
Ω = p0
z + p0
Xχ0
z + p0
¯ p0˜ P0
z + p0
z0˜ Z0
z,
and similarly for M¯ p0, Nz0,a n dN¯ p0.
The following iterative algorithm makes use of the GEE to solve for MPE. The method
begins with an initial guess of the policy rule, χ0 (¯ p,z;ζ). I specify this guess as a tensor
33product of Chebychev polynomials:
χ0 (¯ p,z;ζ)=
N−1 X
i=0
N−1 X
j=0
aijTi (ξ (¯ p))Tj (ϑ(z)), (13)
where Ti is the i-th order Chebychev polynomial, ξ is a linear function mapping a capture
region of ¯ p,d e n o t et h i s[¯ pa, ¯ pb],i n t ot h ei n t e r v a l[−1,+1],a n dϑ maps [0,1] into [−1,+1].
The size of the approximation function is given by N. An initial guess of the policy rule
amounts to an initial guess on the coeﬃcient vector {aij}
N−1
i,j=0.N o t et h a tχ0 is diﬀerentiable
and satisﬁes the limit condition of Subsection 6.1 by construction. Starting with ı =0 :
Step 1. Using χı, solve for approximations to the decision rules, ˜ P and ˜ Z, over a grid of
(¯ p,z) values, G =[¯ pa, ¯ pb] × [0,1),f o rt h eg i v e nζ. This is done by: (a) specifying the
decision rules to be of the same functional form as (13), (b) making an initial guess
on the coeﬃcient vectors, (c) solving constraints M and N for ¯ p0 and z0 over G,a n d
(d) using the ¯ p0 and z0 solutions to iterate on the coeﬃcient vectors until convergence.
Note that ˜ P and ˜ Z are diﬀerentiable by construction. Using χı, ˜ P,a n d˜ Z,s o l v ef o r¯ p0
and z0 values at z =1 ;c a l lt h e s e¯ p0
1 and z0
1.
Step 2. Using χı, ˜ P, ˜ Z, ¯ p0
1,a n dz0
1, solve for approximations to the value function, V (s;ζ),
s ∈ G. This is done by: (a) computing the present discounted value of utility for each
gridpoint, and (b) ﬁtting a function of the form (13) to these points. Note that V is
diﬀerentiable by construction. Also solve for V at z =1 ;c a l lt h i sv1.
Step 3. Using χı, ˜ P, ˜ Z, ¯ p0
1, z0
1, V ,a n dv1, solve the MA’s problem (11), given ζ,f o rX, ¯ p0,
and z0 over the grid G. Whenever the solution is interior (z<1), it can be found by
satisfying constraints M and N, and the GEE (12) with equality. When the solution
is at a corner (z =1 ), it can be found by performing a more tedious line-search for
the maximizing value of X.U s et h eX, ¯ p0,a n dz0 solutions to get a new guess of the
policy rule, χı+1.
I t e r a t eo ns t e p s1t o3u n t i lt h ec o e ﬃcients on the policy rule converge. To check that the
MPE policy rule is unique for a given ζ, do this for several initial guesses, χ0. To ensure
that the policy rule is proportional in ¯ p, choose initial guesses that are non-linear in ¯ p.
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C.1. Derivations for the Discontinuous Policy Rule
Here, I characterize ˆ Xmin, the smallest admissible money growth at z =1 , such that (10)
is a MPE policy rule. Consider all values of s =( ¯ p,z) such that z0 =Z( s,χ(s);χ,ζ)=1 ,
where χ is the diﬀerentiable MPE policy rule of Subsection 6.1; denote these states as ˆ σ ⊆ σ.
Given that X0 = ˆ X, ﬂexible price proﬁts for the φi = φmax ﬁrm at state ˆ s ∈ ˆ σ are given by:
˜ Υ(ˆ s;ζ) ≡
pλ−1
˜ pλ (˜ p − ψ)+β
∙
p0λ−1
˜ pλ (˜ p − ψ) − ψφmax
¸
,
where ˜ p = ˆ λψ,
pλ−1 =
(
1
2
"
(1 − z)
µ
¯ p
ˆ χ(ˆ s)
¶1−λ
+( z +1 )˜ p1−λ
#)−1
,
p0λ−1 =
½
1
2
h¡
1 − z00¢
¯ p00λ−1 +
¡
1+z00¢
˜ p1−λ
i¾−1
,
and z00 =Z ( .,1;.) and ¯ p00 =P ( .,1;.) are the pricing decisions given z0 =1 .G i v e n t h a t
z0 =1 , the decision rules P and Z are independent of the values of ¯ p0 and X0. I index ˜ Υ by
ˆ s to emphasize that ﬂexible price proﬁts depend on (¯ p,z) via pλ−1.I ft h eﬁrm chooses to
deviate by charging a sticky price, it earns proﬁts:
¯ Υ
³
ˆ s, ˆ X;ζ
´
≡
pλ−1
¯ p0λ
¡
¯ p0 − ψ
¢
+ βp0λ−1
Ã
ˆ X
¯ p0
!λ µ
¯ p0
ˆ X
− ψ
¶
,
where
¯ p0 = ˆ λψ
Ã
pλ−1 + βp0λ−1 ˆ Xλ
pλ−1 + βp0λ−1 ˆ Xλ−1
!
.
In order for the deviation to be unproﬁtable, it must be that:
˜ Υ(ˆ s;ζ) ≥ ¯ Υ
³
ˆ s, ˆ X;ζ
´
.
Let ˆ X (ˆ s;ζ)
min denote the smallest ˆ X such that this holds at ˆ s. This condition must hold
for all ˆ s ∈ ˆ σ. Hence, in order for ˆ χ,w i t hˆ χ(¯ p,1;ζ)= ˆ X, to constitute a MPE policy rule it
must be that ˆ X ≥ ˆ Xmin where:
ˆ Xmin =m a x
ˆ s∈ˆ σ
n
ˆ X (ˆ s;ζ)
min
o
.
35C.2. Derivations for the Mixed Strategy Policy Rule
Consider policy rules of the following form:
ˆ χδ (¯ p,z;ζ)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
χ(¯ p,z;ζ) for all ¯ p and z<1
ˆ Xδ for all ¯ p and z =1with probability δ
1 for all ¯ p and z =1with probability 1 − δ
, (14)
where χ is the diﬀerentiable MPE policy rule of Subsection 6.1. When the MA inherits
z =1it generates positive money growth, ˆ Xδ > 1, with probability δ, and zero money
growth otherwise. Showing that rule (14) is a MPE policy rule entails checking that at
z =1 ,n oﬁrm deviates to stickiness.
Ruling out such deviations requires restricting the admissible values of δ. For instance,
in the neighborhood of δ =0 , the optimal sticky price implies negative proﬁtw h e n ˆ Xδ is
realized. Given the option, the ﬁrm would choose to shut down rather than meet demand.
Hence, for δ suﬃciently small, a sticky price ﬁrm will ﬁnd it optimal to simply set a price
in anticipation of zero money growth and shut down when positive money growth occurs.
Accounting for shut down puts a lower bound on the set of feasible δ values.
Let δmin denote the smallest admissible mixing probability such that (14) constitutes a
MPE with the option of shut down. It suﬃces to check that the φi = φmax ﬁrm does not
deviate to stickiness. Denote the states such that z0 =Z( s,χ(s);ζ)=1as ˆ σ ⊆ σ.S i n c et h e
deviating ﬁrm shuts down when ˆ Xδ is realized, it is pricing only for the zero money growth
state in the future and charges a price identical to the optimal ﬂexible price, ¯ p0 =˜ p = ˆ λψ.
Proﬁts from this deviation are:
Θ(ˆ s;ζ) ≡
pλ−1
˜ pλ (˜ p − ψ)+β (1 − δ)
p0λ−1
˜ pλ (˜ p − ψ),
where pλ−1 and p0λ−1 are as given in Subsection C.1 with ˆ χ(ˆ s;ζ) replaced by ˆ χδ (ˆ s;ζ), ˆ s ∈ ˆ σ.
To ensure that this is not proﬁtable, it must be that ˜ Υ(ˆ s;ζ) ≥ Θ(ˆ s;ζ); simplifying this
condition indicates that it holds whenever δ ≥
¡
˜ pλφmax
¢
/
h
p0λ−1
³
ˆ λ − 1
´i
. This condition
is independent of ˆ s and ˆ Xδ. Hence, the smallest feasible mixing probability is:
δmin =
˜ pλφmax
p0λ−1
³
ˆ λ − 1
´. (15)
36For all δ ≥ δmin,t h ev a l u eo f ˆ Xmin
δ is deﬁn e di na ni d e n t i c a lf a s h i o nt o ˆ Xmin above.
As an illustration, Figure 7 plots ˆ Xmin
δ for δ ∈
£
δmin,1
¤
.T h e ﬁgure is plotted for the
baseline calibration, with φmax =3 .6%.A sδ increases, the smallest feasible value of positive
money growth, ˆ Xmin
δ ,a tﬁrst falls and then increases. I brieﬂyd i s c u s st h es o u r c eo ft h i s
non-monotonicity between δ and ˆ Xmin
δ .A g a i n ,ˆ Xmin
δ is deﬁned as the value of money growth
such that ˜ Υ(ˆ s;ζ) ≥ ¯ Υ
³
ˆ s, ˆ Xmin
δ ;ζ
´
. Since, ﬂexible price proﬁts are independent of δ and
ˆ Xδ,t h es l o p e∂ ˆ Xmin
δ /∂δ depends on the eﬀect of δ on sticky price proﬁts, ∂¯ Υ/∂δ,f o rag i v e n
ˆ Xδ.S i n c e ∂¯ Υ/∂ ˆ Xδ < 0, sign
h
∂ ˆ Xmin
δ /∂δ
i
=s i g n
£
∂¯ Υ/∂δ
¤
. The U-shaped pattern is due
to the fact that a change in δ aﬀects sticky price proﬁts via two oﬀsetting channels: ﬁrst,
through the change in weight placed on proﬁts across the positive and zero inﬂation states;
and second, through the change in proﬁts earned in each state, due to the eﬀect of δ on
the optimal sticky price, ¯ p0. Whether the slope, ∂ ˆ Xmin
δ /∂δ, is positive or negative depends
on the sign of each eﬀect and the relative strength of each eﬀect at a particular δ. Further
details are available from the author upon request.
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Figure 3. Best response functions: linear policy rule. Solid line: future expectations coordinated on low inflation equilibrium;
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Figure 4. Best response function: non-linear policy rule. 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6 6.5
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Figure 5. Best response function and fraction of firms choosing price flexibility. Left column: large maximal fixed cost.
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Figure 6. Maximal fixed cost such that pessimistic MPE displays full price flexibility in steady state, for various values of λ. 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
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Figure 7. Minimum money growth rates when MA plays discontinuous, mixed strategy policy rule. 